Reflections on an Earlier Study of Mandatory Retirement: What Came True and What We Can Still Learn by Holden, Karen C & Hansen, W Lee
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
1-1-2000 
Reflections on an Earlier Study of Mandatory Retirement: What 
Came True and What We Can Still Learn 
Karen C. Holden 
University of Wisconson Madison 
W Lee Hansen 
University of Wisconson Madison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Holden, Karen C. and Hansen, W Lee, "Reflections on an Earlier Study of Mandatory Retirement: What 
Came True and What We Can Still Learn" (2000). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 
502. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/502 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2001 publication: To Retire or Not. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/502 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Reflections on an Earlier Study of Mandatory Retirement: What Came True and 
What We Can Still Learn 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2001 publication: To Retire or Not. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/502 
To Retire or Not?
Retirement Policy and Practice
in Higher Education
Edited by
Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
Pension Research Council
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
PENN
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
0
.
8
.
1
8
 
1
4
:
0
2
 
O
C
V
:
0
6
1
4
0
 
C
l
a
r
k
/
T
O
R
E
T
I
R
E
O
R
N
O
T
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
3
o
f
1
8
6
Pension Research Council Publications
A complete list of books in the series appears at the back of this volume
Copyright © 2001 The Pension Research Council of the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Published by
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104–4011
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
To retire or not? : retirement policy and practice in higher
education / edited by Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond.
p. cm.
‘‘Pension Research Council publications’’—T.p. verso.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8122-3572-X (cloth : alk. paper)
1. College teachers—Pensions—United States—Congresses.
I. Clark, Robert Louis, 1949– II. Hammond, P. Brett.
III. Wharton School. Pension Research Council.
LB2334 .T6 2001
331.25'2913781'20973—dc21 00-055218
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
0
.
8
.
1
8
 
1
4
:
0
2
 
O
C
V
:
0
6
1
4
0
 
C
l
a
r
k
/
T
O
R
E
T
I
R
E
O
R
N
O
T
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
4
o
f
1
8
6
Chapter 10
Reflections on an Earlier Study of
Mandatory Retirement: What Came
True and What We Can Still Learn
Karen C. Holden and W. Lee Hansen
When the federal government eliminated age-based mandatory retirement
in 1994, almost two decades of uncertainty ended regarding mandatory re-
tirement age (MRA) policies in higher education. During those years, aca-
deme faced periods of high inflation that threatened to erode the real value
of faculty salaries and pensions and thus, perhaps, delayed retirements and
constrained operating budgets.This in turn limited the ability of institutions
to expand and develop new programs by hiring new faculty. At the same
time, the age distribution of faculty in higher educationmeant a rise in their
mean age even without any change in retirement age policies. The prospect
of uncapping was viewed with the same fears by academic institutions, as was
the earlier rise (in 1982) in the MRA from 65 to 70.
Predictions about the dire effects on colleges and universities of raising
theminimumMRA from age 65 to 70 in the early 1980s, and of subsequently
uncapping the MRA in 1994, failed to materialize (see Smith, this volume).
Yet, as evidenced elsewhere in this volume, colleges and universities con-
tinue to express concern about faculty retirement issues: too many highly
paid (but less productive) professors will continue teaching well into their
70s; early retirement programs developed to help prevent this from occur-
ring will be costly; and the age-bunching of faculty hires from the 1960s will
make the retirement problem even more acute in the coming decade.
This chapter describes and assesses the only nationally representative
study of retirement policies and practices and of retirement behavior in
higher education.We address three questions:
• What are the institutional policies and individual characteristics that
shape retirement timing?
• What bearing do the findings from our earlier study on raising the mini-
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Reflections on an Earlier Study 149
mumallowedMRA from65 to 70 have on understanding how institutions
and individuals may respond to uncapping mandatory retirement? and
• What will the likely pattern be of faculty retirements over the coming
decade?
Lessons Learned from Prior Research:
The 1978 Amendments
Background. The 1978 Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) raised the minimum allowed age of mandatory retire-
ment from 65 to 70 for all Americans but granted a four-year exemption
(until July 1, 1982) for faculty members with indefinite (i.e., tenured) ap-
pointments in institutions of higher education. In the meantime, colleges
and universities could continue to retire faculty forcibly as early as age 65
for reasons of age alone, unless Congress made the exemption permanent,
something it did not do.The subsequent 1986 ADEA eliminated mandatory
retirement at any age, although once again faculty members in higher edu-
cation were exempt, this time through January 1, 1994.
The 1978 and 1986 exemptions for faculty were granted in response to
strong opposition from academe to the loss of what was viewed as an essen-
tial human resource tool. The principal arguments rested on the academic
enterprise’s unique mission to educate the next generation of workers and
scholars and to nurture intellectual and scientific advances. Thus, it was ar-
gued, orderly and predictable retirements were essential to creating oppor-
tunities to hire recently trained new faculty who would further this mission.
In the absence of this means of compelling older faculty to retire, the intel-
lectual atmosphere and rewards and the nonphysically demanding nature
of the job would lead to unacceptable delays in retirement. In addition, it
was generally accepted wisdom that the defined contribution plans cover-
ing faculty in private institutions, in contrast to the defined benefit plans
in public institutions and private industry, provided a financial incentive to
delay retirement well past the plan’s ‘‘normal’’ retirement age.
Because so little was known about the actual effect of MRA policies on
retirement behavior even for the general workforce, a provision of the 1978
legislation called for the U.S. Department of Labor to carry out a study of
the effect of raising theMRA to 70, including a separate study specifically on
its impact for higher education. In 1979wewere commissioned to undertake
the study of ending the 1978 exemption for tenured faculty.
Our study addressed four major questions: (1) What MRA policies pre-
vailed in higher education? (2) What effect did these and other person-
nel policies have on the age of retirement of faculty members? (3) What
would be the likely, first-round effects of raising the MRA from 65 to 70?
(4) What adaptations in behavior both by higher education institutions and
faculty would be triggered by such a change? These were not easily answered
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150 Karen C. Holden and W. Lee Hansen
questions since an MRA is just one factor influencing retirement. Personal
characteristics of faculty members, institutional characteristics, job histo-
ries and current responsibilities, and fringe benefit and other personnel
policies also influence when faculty members retire. Thus, understanding
mandatory retirement policy effects required collecting and analyzing data
so that we could distinguish the influence of other important factors from
that of mandatory retirement rules. There were no national data on retire-
ment policies and faculty characteristics across universities and colleges, so
we collected data from a sample of institutions and from their tenured fac-
ulty members. This matched institutional-faculty data set still remains the
only nationally representative study of retirement policies, pensions, and re-
tirement timing in academe (Hansen andHolden 1981b; U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Select Committee on Aging 1982; Holden and Hansen 1989).
Although the surveys were conducted in 1979–80 and the study was com-
pleted in 1981, the findings on the determinants of retirement timing remain
relevant to the current debate over the consequences of finally eliminating
mandatory retirement in higher education. This claim stems from the fol-
lowing observations: (1) the underlying factors shaping retirement behavior
have not changed to any substantial degree; (2) TIAA-CREF and state plans
continue to be the principal retirement plans for the vast majority of fac-
ulty members and thus shape retirement options despite somewhat greater
flexibility since then in benefit structure and supplemental annuity options;
(3) evidence on retirement rates from those few institutions that in 1979–80
had no age of mandatory retirement both anticipated and are suggestive of
the effects of raising theMRA to 70 and eventually uncapping it in 1994. Fur-
ther, the chapters in this volume that describe primarily an uncapped world
confirm many of our study’s conclusions and predictions about retirement
behavior in general and MRA effects specifically.
Retirement timing determinants. The lessons from our study that are most
relevant to understanding the current and future patterns of faculty retire-
ment include the following: (1) The absence of a comprehensive database
severely limits the ability of higher education to plan for externally man-
dated personnel policy changes and is essential for understanding current
and future retirement behavior; (2) although private institutions were more
likely than public institutions to have an MRA of 65, they coupled this with
liberal extension policies that resulted in similar retirement age patterns
on average between public and private institutions; (3) although public and
private institutions were generally covered by different types of plans, type
of plan did not matter in explaining retirement patterns; (4) the average
expected age of retirement is different for faculty members in public and
private institutions, but this difference cannot be attributed to MRA poli-
cies; (5) other institutional policies matter and have an important influence
on retirement timing in higher education; and (6) although eliminating the
MRA would lead to some faculty continuing longer than they otherwise
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Reflections on an Earlier Study 151
would be able to, it is the more productive faculty members who tend to
retire later.
The matched faculty-institutional data. We developed two surveys, one for a
nationally representative sample of colleges and universities and another
for a sample of faculty members at the responding institutions.1 Informa-
tion came from a sample of institutions drawn to reflect the population of
degree-granting institutions with 250 or more students, including two-year
community colleges, four-year colleges, and research universities.We then
surveyed faculty at responding institutions; responses came frommore than
6,000 associate and full professors at the 298 responding institutions. We
matched the individual faculty data with that from the specific institution
in which they were employed.
From institutions we obtained data on institutional characteristics, fac-
ulty numbers, and retirement-related policies. This included information
on retirement age policies (mandatory, normal, and early ages of retire-
ment) both at the time of the survey and just prior to the 1978 amendments,
on the age distributions of their current faculty and of faculty retirements
over the previous two years (1978–79, 1979–80), on benefit formulas for
those covered by defined benefit plans, on contribution schedules for those
covered by defined contribution plans, on reductions in pension benefits
for early retirement, and on any post-MRA employment restrictions. We
asked each faculty member for their expected age of retirement as well as
demographic characteristics, work histories, professional accomplishments,
health conditions, accumulations in defined contribution plans (most often
TIAA-CREF), years covered by their current retirement plan, and their cur-
rent institutional salary.We also obtained information on any other type of
retirement benefits they expected to receive, including Social Security and
pensions from former jobs. In addition, respondents provided detailed in-
formation on all sources of current income (institutional salary as well as
income from, for example, consulting fees) and expected sources of income
after retirement. To help understand the impact of other fringe benefits we
obtained from each institution information on the availability and continua-
tion into retirement of life insurance and health insurance policies, since
the loss of this coverage would be a real economic loss on retirement. The
linking of the two surveys enabled us to calculate the pension amounts—
whether from a defined benefit or defined contribution plan—for which a
facultymember would be eligible at different retirement ages.We could thus
estimate, in combination with individual faculty service and salary charac-
teristics, the incentives built into each pension for retirement at alternative
ages. Our analysis focused on faculty members who were age 56–64, the
group we expected to be most aware of and affected by the MRA provisions
and the subsequent expiration of the faculty exemption.2
Distribution and enforcement of MRA policies. Our study found thatMRApoli-
cies were neither universal nor strictly enforced during the period when
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152 Karen C. Holden and W. Lee Hansen
Table 1. Distribution of Full-Time Faculty by Mandatory Retirement Age and
by Type of Institution, 1980
Percent of full-time faculty
Percent of all faculty with MRA of age
Type of institution With no MRA With MRA-total 65 66–68 70+
Private 1.2 21.9 13.0 1.4 7.5
2-year 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.3
4-year 0.9 14.5 8.3 0.6 5.6
University 0.0 7.0 4.5 0.8 1.7
Public 11.1 65.7 19.4 2.6 43.7
2-year 6.2 19.7 10.9 0.0 8.8
4-year 3.7 25.8 5.2 0.0 20.6
University 1.2 20.2 3.3 2.6 14.3
Total 12.4 87.6 32.3 4.0 51.3
Source: Holden and Hansen (1981b)
Cells are percentage of all faculty in that group.
they existed.This meant their potential impact on retirement timing varied
across institutions and that the impact of eliminating the MRA was moder-
ated. Just prior to passage of the 1978 ADEA, 84 percent of all responding
institutions had some age of mandatory retirement with the majority (73
percent) setting this age at 65, 20 percent at 70, and the remainder having no
MRA. A sharp contrast was evident between public and private institutions,
with fewer than half the public universities (46 percent) and public four-year
colleges (47 percent) having an age of 65 as compared to 81 percent and 67
percent of private colleges and universities, respectively. Because public in-
stitutions are on average larger, even at the time the 1978 ADEA was passed
only about half of all full-time faculty members were covered by an MRA of
65. Another 15 percent were subject to an MRA of 66–68.
By the time of our survey—in 1980, about two years before the expira-
tion of the exemption—only one third of all full-time faculty members were
employed in institutions with an MRA of 65; another half were covered by
an MRA of 70, while the remaining 12 percent were subject to no MRA
(Table 1). Public institutions hadmovedmost rapidly after 1978 to raise their
MRA; 56 percent of public institutions with an MRA below 70 had raised
or eliminated their MRA in contrast to only 25 percent of private institu-
tions. As a result, among institutions with anMRA in 1980, only 26 percent of
public universities and 34 percent of public four-year colleges had an MRA
of 65 in 1980 as compared to 64 percent and 61 percent, respectively, for
comparable private institutions.
Mandatory retirement does not require total separation from academic
employment, and institutions reported considerable flexibility in its appli-
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Reflections on an Earlier Study 153
Table 2. Average Expected Retirement Age and Percentage of Faculty Expecting
to Retire Before Age 67 and 70, by Mandatory Retirement Age, by Age
and Control of Institution
Expected Percent expecting to Percent expecting to
retirement age before age 67 retire before age 70
and Type of MRA MRA MRA MRA MRA MRA
Institution 65 70 65 70 65 70
Current
age 63–64,
All 66.3* 67.2 69.8* 52.6 81.1 69.2
Public 65.6* 66.8 90.5*** 57.8 90.5 78.1
Private 66.8** 69.0 56.2* 28.6 75.0*** 28.6
Source: Holden and Hansen (1981b).
Different from retirement probability with MRA of 70:
*Significant at .01; **significant at .05; ***significant at .1.
cation. Only a small fraction—13 percent—of all institutions in our survey
that reported an MRA of 65 responded that retirement was in fact required
at that age. Extensions beyond that date were standard, with most institu-
tions reporting no age limit for extensions, while others granted extensions
for one to five years. In effect, theMRA in higher education signaled the end
of a tenure contract at which time some faculty members who could con-
tinue their teaching and research, perhaps after a review by colleagues or
administrators on their ability to continue to perform effectively.The ability
to extend service beyond the formalMRAmeant the exemption’s expiration
promised to have a smaller impact on retirement timing than might have
been expected although its expiration would clearly alter the nature of the
post-65 employment contract.
Expected and actual retirement ages. Few faculty members plan a complete
cessation of academic work after their expected age of retirement. In this
study, we defined retirement as that age at which a person ceased employ-
ment at the institution at which he or she held a full-time, tenured job at
the time of our survey. It is this institution-based job change that is the issue
in estimating MRA effects on institutional retirement patterns and budgets.
Thus, our data on retirement patterns refer to the age at which faculty sepa-
rate from the institution at which they are employed, regardless of whether
they seek a postretirement teaching assignment elsewhere.
The reported prevalence of service extensions beyond the official MRA
in part explains why the average actual retirement age for faculty—even at
schools with a 65 MRA—was higher than that.The average expected retire-
ment age among faculty who would reach age an MRA of 65 before the ex-
emption expired was also above 65. We examined differences in expected
retirement age by age of MRA prevailing at the institution. In Table 2 we
show differences for faculty who were age 63–64, a group that would still
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154 Karen C. Holden and W. Lee Hansen
have been covered by the 1978 ADEA exemption when they reached age 65.
Although faculty members employed in institutions with an MRA of 65 had
a somewhat lower expected retirement age (66.3 years vs. 67.2), the strik-
ing difference is between retirement ages in private and public institutions.
Indeed, the average expected retirement age at public institutions with an
MRA of 70 is identical to that at private institutions with an MRA of 65.
Expected retirement from public institutions was significantly earlier than
from private institutions, regardless of the MRA in effect (i.e., whether it is
age 65 or 70).3
Type and value of retirement benefit plans. Because virtually all institutions
offer their faculty members some kind of pension plan, the question for col-
leges and universities is not whether having a pension makes a difference to
retirement timing, but rather the influence of different plans on retirement
timing of individual faculty members. Faculty in our survey who were em-
ployed in private institutions were covered primarily by TIAA-CREF while
those at public institutions were covered by a state retirement plan. Thus,
to some extent perceptions of and empirical estimates of MRA effects are
confounded by systematic differences between public and private institu-
tions in both MRA and plan type (see also Clark et al., this volume). The
gains to postponing retirement for a faculty member covered by a defined
contribution plan will depend primarily on the expected investment earn-
ings on accumulations. For faculty covered by a defined benefit plan the
gain will depend primarily on expected increases in salary, which raises the
salary average in the formula, and the contribution of the additional year
of service.What type of plan is most likely to encourage delayed retirement
depends on how expected gains in market earnings compare to salary (and
formula) increases.We estimated these gains for faculty in our sample using
1981 prevailing interest and earnings gain expectations.4
For each institution we estimated the pension for which a faculty member
with an identical service and salary profile would be eligible at age 65 and at
66.The benefit at age 65 and the gain in pension on delaying retirement by
one year was almost identical on average for faculty in TIAA-CREF and in
public plans.This indicated that, contrary to the then prevailing wisdom, on
average the benefit gained by including one more year and a higher salary
was equivalent to the then-actuarial gain and additional dividends provided
by TIAA-CREF. One explanation is the short salary-averaging period (typi-
cally three years) in defined benefit plans in higher education, which in
combination with additional years of service lead to relatively high gains
from continued work if salary increases are generous. Although other rela-
tive salary gain and investment earning scenarios would alter these com-
parative estimates, our pension simulations showed that relativemarket and
compensation conditions, not basic plan types, determine the gains to post-
poned retirements. These similar averages between the two types of plans,
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Reflections on an Earlier Study 155
however, obscure enormous variations within each type of plan. For ex-
ample, the most generous public pension offered a benefit 2.5 times that
offered by the least generous state plan to an identically positioned faculty
member.
Identifying the separate effects of an MRA and other factors. We assessed the
separate effect on average retirement age of an MRA by estimating a retire-
ment model built around the assumption that faculty members are influ-
enced by the relative rewards of retirement versus those of continuing to be
employed in their current positions (see Appendix A and Keefe, this vol-
ume). Two approaches were taken. In the first approach we estimated the
effect of an MRA on the actual retirement probabilities reported by institu-
tions, controlling for institutional characteristics (public, private, and size),
postretirement fringe benefit continuation (health insurance, and life insur-
ance), and pension wealth (estimated for a hypothetical faculty under each
institution’s pension plan but with identical personal characteristics across
institutions). In the other, which was the main focus of our study, we used
thematched institutional-faculty data to examine determinants of expected
retirement age, controlling for the same institutional characteristics as in
the first analysis, plus individual-specific pension wealth and other financial
characteristics. Because of the absence of any prior data on retirement be-
havior, our study relied on comparison of retirement behavior of faculty sub-
ject to different (including no) MRA rules to infer how changing the MRA
would influence retirement timing.
In analyzing retirement probabilities at the institutional level, we esti-
mated the effect of an MRA on the probabilities of retiring over a one-
year period between ages 60 and 65 and between ages 60 and 69, using in-
stitutionally provided data on actual retirements. Three main conclusions
emerged. First, an MRA (of 65) appears to have a relatively small effect on
retirements, raising the probability among faculty 60–69 of retiring before
age 65 by about 12 percentage points and before 70 by about 22 percent-
age points. At the mean an MRA of 70 (versus an MRA of 65) raises the
average age of retirement from 65.6 to 67.0 years even when controlling for
the retirement effects of institutionally provided benefits and the change
in present value of the institution’s primary pension plan if benefits were
postponed from age 65 to 66. Second, private institutions, even after ad-
justing for average annuity wealth offers, could still expect to experience
lower rates of retirement—by about 12 percentage points before age 65 and
by about 15 percent before age 70. Third, the continuation of other fringe
benefits into retirement has an equal or larger impact on retirement timing.
Health insurance continuation offers raise the probability of retirement be-
fore age 65 by about 14 percentage points. Somewhat surprising, pension
wealth had no effect on the actual retirement probabilities, a result perhaps
of having to use a value for a hypothetical faculty member whose charac-
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156 Karen C. Holden and W. Lee Hansen
teristics are identical across institutions. This is consistent with our earlier
conclusion that it is not broad pension type that matters, but how pension
policy interacts with institution-specific hiring and salary policies.
We estimated a second retirement model, this time of retirement age ex-
pectations of individual faculty members. The matched faculty-institution
data enabled us to incorporate the richer matched data including that on
other financial assets held by the individual. The pension wealth variable
was based on individual salary-service and contribution profiles. Results are
presented in Appendix A,Table A1, with separate estimates for faculty aged
56–61, the group who could anticipate being subject to a minimumMRA of
70, and for those aged 62–64, who would have been subject to the ADEA
exemption. The major conclusions we draw from this analysis follow.
Among the older group, the presence of anMRA of 65 accelerated retire-
ment by about 1.1 years. This contrasts with the separate effect of employ-
ment in a private institution that alone raised the retirement age by even
more—1.5 years later than faculty at public universities. Not surprisingly, an
MRA of 65 had no effect on the retirement plans of younger faculty since
they knew then they would be able to work up to age 70. For the younger fac-
ulty, however, the further they were from age 65, the younger they expected
to retire.
We were surprised to find that the level of pension wealth did not affect
retirement timing for the older faculty, although for younger faculty, the
additional gains anticipated in earnings and pensions had a delaying effect
on the expected age of retirement. Perhaps the most relevant finding for
predicting uncapping effects was the increased chances of delaying retire-
ment as nonsalary professional income rose. This is consistent with Switkes’s
discussion of the experience with the California voluntary early retirement
plans (VERIPs) under which those faculty who had other employment op-
portunities had lower early retirement take-up rates and with Keefe’s con-
clusions that it was the more accomplished scholars who delayed retirement
(Switkes, this volume; Keefe, this volume).
Ourmajor conclusionwas that it was the combination of rewards provided
by higher education to continued employment that mattered with an MRA
playing a relatively small role. Factors that remain under control of admin-
istrators—salary increases, pension benefit gains with continued work, and
research support—encourage faculty to plan a relatively late retirement. In-
deed, our interpretation of the effect of nonsalary professional income on
retirement timing is that faculty engaged in consulting activities depend on
an institutional affiliation for the continuation of those activities. While in
some occupations opportunities to earn outside a regular job may continue
even after (early) retirement, this appears not to be the case in academe
where the receipt of outside income may be conditioned on an institutional
affiliation and use of institutional facilities. Our conclusion on the impor-
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Reflections on an Earlier Study 157
tance of ongoing institutional affiliation to the ability of faculty members
to continue receiving outside income suggest that Cornell University was
right on target in proposing supplements to emeritus status as one tool for
encouraging early retirement (Ehrenberg et al., this volume).
Finally, our analysis of both actual and expected retirement timing high-
lights once again the difference between public and private institutions: at
the latter faculty expect to retire later even after controlling for pension and
MRA policies.We conclude that the perception that pension plan type mat-
ters (with defined contribution plans such as TIAA-CREF encouraging later
retirement) is wrong. The public-private variable is picking up some other
aspect of retirement policies of the academic environment that encourages
earlier retirement.
Faculty productivity and retirement expectations. Because a critical issue in the
debate on uncappingMRA is the scholarly productivity of faculty whowould
otherwise have retired, we asked faculty respondents about the number of
articles published in the last three years and over their lifetime, as well as
their perceptions of the quality of their research and scholarly output rela-
tive to that of other faculty in their field, plus a self-assessment of their
teaching effectiveness. The analysis of retirement age expectations (Appen-
dix A) indicated that faculty currently engaged in research expected to re-
tire later—by as much as 1.4 years—than those reporting they were not en-
gaged in research. This result is net of other effects and is consistent with
Switkes’s report of the California experience in which those with more re-
cent publication retired at lower rates (Switkes, this volume).
Simulating effects on budget costs and new hire. We used our data on faculty
age structure and retirement expectations to simulate the effect on budget
and new hiring of having an age 65 versus age 70 MRA. Assuming constant
faculty size, the higherMRAwould raise average budget costs within the first
five years by about 2 percentage points. New hires initially drop by about
20 percent below the level prevailing with an MRA of 65 but then begin to
slowly rise back to near but not quite up to their old levels.When the simu-
lations are undertaken with different faculty age structures the effects in five
years on faculty budget costs ranges between 1.7 and 3.7 percent with a fall
in that percentage and a narrowing of the range over time. For new hires as
well the largest impact is in the short term but quickly diminishes. For the
oldest age distributions hirings are actually greater in some later years than
they would have been under a younger MRA.
Early retirement incentives. Because other personnel tools will have to be
used in an era of a higher (and uncapped) MRA to manage retirements, we
explored the attractiveness of several early retirement incentives (ERI) on
expected retirement timing. Faculty respondents were presented with three
hypothetical offers: (1) their pension benefit levels would not be reduced
if they took early retirement; (2) their pension benefits, though reduced
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for early retirement, would be fully adjusted for cost of living changes dur-
ing their entire retired life; and (3) faculty could phase down their work-
load, with proportionate reductions in their salaries in the years immedi-
ately prior to their currently expected retirement age.We asked individuals
not only about their interest in each plan but also the age at which they
would definitely or possibly take up one of these options.
Among faculty members in our survey (all of whom were age 50 or older)
about 25 percent said they would definitely retire earlier if there were no
penalty for early retirement. While another 27 percent said they possibly
would retire earlier, 41 percent said they definitely would not be interested.
The average age at which people said they would retire under such an offer
was age 62 compared with their average expected retirement age of 66.
Despite then high prevailing rates of inflation, only 22 percent of faculty
said that with a fully inflation-indexed pension they would definitely retire
earlier and would do so at age 62. The option attractive to the most was the
phased retirement offer; 37 percent said they would definitely take such an
option although47percent expressed absolutely no interest. Postretirement
indexing would reduce the average age of retirement by 2.4 years, and the
ability to reduce work load would accelerate retirement by 2.9 years.
Faculty age affected the attractiveness of these options, a conclusion that
has important implications for the short- and long-term impact of early re-
tirement offers. Faculty members 65–69 expressed no interest in retiring
earlier; these individuals had already planned (and acted upon) a delayed
retirement or may have been close enough to their expected retirement age
that little change in age (even if they took the offer) was possible.These op-
tions were also of little interest to the 50–59-year-olds whose expected re-
tirement ages were already relatively early. These options mattered most to
the age group 60–64, who on average expected to work another six years.
Because an ERI offer appeared to accelerate retirement—and by evenmore
than did an MRA of 65—we conclude that these may be powerful tools for
managing retirement timing. Faculty actively engaged in research as well as
those who were not were equally likely to accelerate retirement, although
the former group made this change from an already later age of retirement.
Thus, it appears that with appropriate early retirement incentives, both less
productive faculty members, who already plan to retire somewhat earlier,
and more productive faculty members can be encouraged to retire earlier
than they had expected to retire.
At the time of our survey, few institutions offered ERIs that were anywhere
near as attractive as these options. In the institutional survey we tried to
obtain data on early retirement benefits that were universally offered to fac-
ulty through provisions built into institutional retirement plans as well as
those paid fully out of institutional budgets and designed specifically to tar-
get early retirees. About 20 percent of all institutions reported some form
of early retirement incentives in their pension plan, including 36 percent
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of private universities and 22 percent of public universities. Closer exami-
nation of institutional ERIs revealed that almost half were optional tax de-
ferred annuity (TDA) plans available to faculty members through salary re-
ductions under IRS code, section 403(b). While the responses indicate a
realization by administrators that financial incentives are important to re-
tirement timing, these TDAs offered no greater advantage to earlier retire-
ment than would any defined contribution pension plan.
Institutions were also asked about the ability of facultymembers to reduce
workloads prior to normal retirement age. Overall, about one third allowed
this option, with public universities, in particular, most likely to allow fac-
ulty to work part time. Unfortunately, because nothing is known about the
conditions faculty must meet to take advantage of this option, it is impos-
sible to evaluate the attractiveness of decreased workloads. Only 31 percent
of institutions with a 65MRA offered a part-time teaching option compared
with half of those with a 70 MRA.This suggests that institutions with higher
MRAs and public institutions have adjusted in part by offering the option
of reduced work loads. The survey results reported by Keefe in this volume
document additional movement in this direction, although public institu-
tions remain more likely to have such plans.
How Serious Is the Impact of Uncapping?
If an MRA has an effect on any individual’s retirement plans, a change in
that policy would lead to some increase in the number retiring after age
70. This increase would be smaller for those institutions that had liberally
provided for extensions beyond their formerly established MRA.Thus, it is
not surprising to see some small number of faculty delaying retirement be-
yond age 65 with the rise inMRA and beyond age 70 after uncapping (Clark
et al., this volume). An opposing effect of uncapping MRA might also be
observed as the MRA is removed as a target age of retirement. That is, as
faculty must pay more attention to and are educated by their institutions
about other retirement benefit provisions, retirement rates may rise among
younger faculty. Clark et al. in this volume report higher rates of retirement
among some younger people; the stability of mean ages of retirement even
as some faculty delay retirement past age 70 imply increases in retirement
rates at younger ages.
Whether the observed or anticipated change in retirement rates should
be a concern to affected institutions depends on the teaching and research
productivity of those who delay retirement. Clearly the academic enterprise
is worse off if less productive faculty members continue past age 70, while
those who are popular teachers and would otherwise publish and bring in
grant money to support the research and teaching enterprise retire early.
Most chapters in this volume address the question of retirement numbers
with but few addressing the question of individual retiree characteristics. In
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part the inability to address productivity effects adequately is a result of the
continuing lack of a comprehensive data set on retirement policies and re-
tirement behavior of faculty across all types of institutions of higher educa-
tion. For example, Clark et al. (this volume) in their modeling of retirement
behavior at three North Carolina universities are restricted to data available
from institutional records, lacking what turned out to be important in our
study—information on other sources of income and activities outside that
particular institution.
Although our study was of the effect of changing the MRA from 65 to
70, our findings anticipate many of those of uncapping.The reports of both
the National Research Council’s Committee on Mandatory Retirement in
Higher Education and Project on Faculty Retirement concluded that the in-
crease in the number extending beyond 70 would be small; that those who
did extend would tend to be the most productive; and that the private re-
search universities whose average age of retirement was highest were most
able to afford well targeted early retirement programs (Smith, this volume).
The studies in this volume show that a small number have continued past
age 70, while most faculty retire well before that age. Indeed both the data
on the age distribution at retirement and on the unchanged mean age of
retirement after uncapping imply a spreading of retirement age as faculty
take other factors into account than the targeted MRA as they plan their
retirement. Clark et al. in this volume point out the seeming anomaly of
increases in retirement rates for faculty younger than age 70. Recently ob-
tained data from the University of Wisconsin, Madison campus, which had
its MRA eliminated during the exempt period (O’Neil, this volume) showed
a slight increase in retirement numbers and a decline in average age of re-
tirement from age 66.0 to 65.3 after its uncapping.
Conclusion
The challenge in assessing the effect of changes in one retirement policy
on retirement timing, faculty age distributions, hiring options, and salary
costs, is separating its effects from other demographic and economic con-
straints that would have operated even without that policy change to alter
the faculty age distribution and raise institutional costs. The strength of
our 1980–81 study lies in attempting to understand the interplay between
faculty decisions to retire and the institutionally provided benefits they ex-
pect to receive.Unfortunately, higher education has never launched a long-
term effort to collect data necessary to understand how and why retirement
decisions of faculty members have changed over time and in response to
political, institutional, andpersonal factors. Large national data sets provide
these data for the general population (e.g., the Health and Retirement
Study) but contain only a small number of faculty members. Institutional
employment data do not provide the rich individual and social context
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within which these decisions are made. TIAA-CREF covers the majority of
faculty members working in private institutions, and although it covers an
increasing number in public institutions, it still excludes that larger group
of faculty members. Because private and public institutions differ so sub-
stantially, an analysis that is confined to one or the other sector will leave im-
portant questions unanswered. As it was, the institutions taking advantage
of the exemption were largely private colleges and universities, and private
research universities in particular. It may be possible to examine the deter-
minants of faculty retirement in those institutions and even their responses
to early retirement incentives, but an important question remains: How dif-
ferent is the experience at these institutions from that of public institutions
which for themost part did not take advantage of theMRAexemption? Simi-
larly, looking only at the experience of private research universities, about
which there is the greatest concern, one can see only part of the picture.
One of our strongest conclusions is that we need better, industrywide data
on faculty in higher education.
The measured effects of uncapping are mixed, a result anticipated in the
studies of both the 1978 and 1986 ADEA amendments. Although some in-
stitutions saw increases in the number of faculty working up to age 70, the
numbers were small, and many institutions saw no major change in retire-
ment rates. Our own analysis anticipated what happened—that the major
private research institutions were more likely to find their faculty delaying
retirements. But these were precisely those institutions in which even prior
to 1978 faculty were most likely to delay retirement, and apparently not
simply because of defined benefit coverage, but because of some combina-
tion of factors thatmade delayed retirementmore attractive to these faculty.
This is good news if delayed retirement was and continues to be more likely
because of the institutions’ well-targeted (even if unintentional) incentives
to continue productive teaching and research. Even if the news is not all
good for these institutions, broad changes should not be made (eg in pen-
sion plans) until it is clear what the factors are leading to delayed retirements
and their productivity consequences. Our study does support the develop-
ment of options that allow faculty to move into part-time assignments that
permit them to continue their research and in some cases limited teaching
activity.
Several authors suggest that other economic and noneconomic factors
are almost certain to dominate the effects of the relatively small numbers of
faculty continuing to teach beyond age 70 (Keefe, this volume).We suggest
further research on understanding the role and potential impact of these
nonpension benefits on retirement behavior. In addition, at the institutional
level the impact of other variables is considerable as our simulations show.
In particular, enrollment levels and the revenues they produce, whether
through tuition or public subsidies, fluctuate considerably from year to year.
The number of faculty on the payroll varies from year to year because of un-
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expected resignations and less than perfect timing in hiring replacements.
Research funding that supports faculty salaries also varies. In short, the fis-
cal and other effects of faculty continuing until age 70 and beyond appear
to be relatively small, when compared with the impact of other forces. This
conclusion does not suggest that ‘‘at the margin’’ the continuation of fac-
ulty beyond age 70 is of no concern. But with unexpected variations on so
many margins, this one is hardly critical and should not be used to divert
attention of academe from more critical retirement policy issues.
Appendix A
Our estimated model took the form of
RA = f (E,WEALTH i , DELTAWEALTH i , Xi , Fi),
where
RA is defined as the relevant retirement age,
E is earnings that would be received from an additional year of work.
WEALTH is the present value of future retirement benefits,
DELTAWEALTH is the change in the present value of retirement benefits
if deferred for another year,
X represents personal and institutional characteristics,
F represents participation changes upon retirement in other fringe
benefits.
Description of Variables
Dependent Variable: In the retirement estimates based on institutionally pro-
vided retirement data, RA is the probability that faculty within a particular
age group one year prior to the survey retired during the following year.
In the estimates based on faculty provided data, RA is the expected age at
which the faculty expected to retire from their institution.
Independent variables:
Pv65 Present value of retirement benefit income stream at age 65
($1,000); discount rate depends on postretirement inflation
adjustments
CHPA Net gains from postponing retirement from age 65 to 66
($1,000); equal to the change in present value of the pension
between age 65 and 66 plus the earnings during that addi-
tional year of work
INCDIFF Professional income earned in 1979 above basic institutional
salary ($1,000)
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WEALTH Total value of assets plus housing equity at age 65 assuming an
interest rate of 2.5% between current age and age 65 ($1,000)
NOSS Dummy variable equal to 1 if institution is covered by social
security
CW Dummy variable equal to 1 if faculty member is currently en-
gaged in scholarly research that is likely to lead to publication
or other form of dissemination in the next several years
PUB3 Number of articles in professional journals during the past
3 years
BOOKS3 Number of books authored or coauthored during past 3 years
STEV Dummy variable equal to 1 if teaching is evaluated as excel-
lent or above average
HINS Dummy variable equal to I if health insurance coverage con-
tinues on retirement
LINS Dummy variable equal to 1 if life insurance continues for re-
tiree
CONTST Dummy variable equal to 1 if contributions to retirement plan
stop at some age
MR65 Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a mandatory retirement
age of 65
YRS65 65 minus current age
HLTH Dummy variable equal to 1 if health is excellent or good
MARSTATE A dummy variable equal to 1 if married
MATY Spouse’s income in 1979 ($1,000)
SEX Dummy variable equal to 1 if male
UNIV Dummy variable equal to 1 if employed
TWOYR Dummy variable equal to 1 if employed at a two-year college
PUBPRV Dummy variable equal to 1 if employed at a private institution
Table A1. Determinants of Expected Retirement Age Faculty Members 56–61
and 62–64.
56–61 62–64
Constant 64.6 65.8
Financial variables
PV65 −.0025 .0063
CHPA .0897*** .0200
INCDIFF −.0069 .1038***
WEALTH −.0028 −.0033*
NOSS .3988 −1.5482***
Productivity measures
CW 1.4050*** .6354
PUB3 .0825*** .0843
BOOK3 −.3984* .1785
STEV .2024 .3804
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Table A1. Continued
56–61 62–64
Institutional policies
HINS .1229 −.0618
LINS −.0597 −1.0977**
CONTST .5755 1.0308
MR65 .3889 −1.0874**
Demographic and institutional characteristics
YRS65 −.3314*** −.2622
HLTH .7986 1.0061
MARSTAT −.5966 1.0597
MATY −.0012 −.0095
SEX .9576* −.7856
UNIV −.1532 .7340
TWOYR −.7932 1.7141**
PUBPRV .1517 1.5081**
R 2 .15 .24
F 3.29 1.71
N 405 139
Source: Holden and Hansen, 1981b.
***Significant at .01 level;** significant at .05 level; * significant at .10 level.
Notes
1. The institutional sample was drawn from the U.S. Department of Education’s
1978–79 Directory of Educational Institutions and the faculty sample matched to these
institutions was drawn from 1979 The Education Directory compiled and published by
an organization with the same name. For more details, see (Holden and Hansen
1981b).The resulting data were weighted to adjust for sampling and response rate
differences between public and private institutions and by institutional size.
2. We asked each facultymember to report his or her current expected retirement
age and used this age as ourmeasure of retirement timing.Use of information on ex-
pectations was unique and controversial at the time but has since been incorporated
into the Health and Retirement Survey and widely accepted as a legitimate measure
of retirement timing (Ekerdt et al. 1996; Gustman et al. 1995; Honig 1996).
3. The same contrast appears to exist for faculty not subject to anyMRA, although
the number in our sample who were 63–64 of age is small. All were in public insti-
tutions. But on average, these faculty expected to retire 1.7 years earlier than did
faculty employed in private institutions and covered by an age 70 MRA.
4. Wealth calculation takes into account both survival probabilities and benefit
gains to postponed retirement. We assumed a fixed TIAA-CREF annuity would be
taken at the specified retirement age and the dividend rate was 8 percent. We as-
sumed a real discount rate of 5 percent and a then-realistic inflation rate of 10 per-
cent with inflation adjustments in the annuity options modifying the inflation com-
ponent. If plans were integrated with social security, we included the effect of that
integration on the increase in benefits and TIAA-CREF accounts on gains in service
and salary.
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